In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall observed that a government cannot be called a "government of laws, and not of men . . . if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right." 1 Justice Marshall's celebrated quote is more than a modest reminder that in any given legal system there is no right without a remedy. It is a restatement that when governments themselves violate legal rights, it is especially important to furnish a remedy.
To be sure, legal scholars agree that providing remedies to the victims of violations of rights after the fact-whether this law is domestic or international-is an imperfect solution at best. However, the disagreement seems to emerge generally once lawyers and legal scholars attempt to define what is the chief goal of a particular legal remedy. For instance, a remedy plausibly provides reparation in certain instances or the opportunity to ventilate grievances in other situations. Ideally, backward-looking remedies can deter future violations. In theory, if government officials or agencies know that they will be held to account, they will be less likely to commit violations in the first place. More
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NO RIGHT WITHOUT A REMEDY 831 broadly, remedies perform an important expressive function: they drive home the idea that the law takes violations seriously. As investor-state arbitration becomes the dominant remedy to enforce international investment obligations, it is important to ask the following questions: What is the primary purpose of investorstate arbitration?
And, how the different functional conceptualizations of investor-state arbitration would-in practice-interact with the rights conferred under international law? The two fundamental questions may be at the crux of one of the main debates of the field, as can be discerned from recent cases before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
In this essay, I analyze an external face and fundamental part of international investment law: its remedy to enforce a breach. I argue that the remedy is subject to different conceptualizations that may affect the way in which adjudicators understand what type of right (i.e., direct rights, beneficiary rights, or agency) is conferred to investors when granted the direct invocation of responsibility against a host state. I do so by reference to the debate around the operation of the circumstances precluding wrongfulness for the breach of an investment treaty by characterizing a conduct as a countermeasure in response to an anterior breach by a home state. Or-in more simple terms-the debate regarding to whom international countermeasure are opposable. Using this debate, I show that the different justifications relied upon to promote investor-state arbitration as the main remedy of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) allow at least three different understandings of that question and, by implication, different relational dimensions of remedy. These different conceptualizations emphasize investor-state arbitration as enabling (primarily) one of the following functions of legal remedies: (a) procedural justice; (b) corrective justice; or (c) deterrence.
Before proceeding, a cautionary note is in order: the analysis in this essay provides an opportunity to examine whether and how the invocation of responsibility by a non-state actor against a host state can be conceptualized in different ways and some of the consequences thereof. Whether the interpretation of the rights should be necessarily determined by such conceptualization, as a starting point, is a different question. This is ultimately a matter of treaty interpretation. 2 However, for the purpose of this Article, and in no way dismissing the issues noted above, a lack of interpretative guidance in the relevant treaty will be taken for granted. Not only is the interpretative guidance of BITs on this issue generally unclear, but it is in these situations that adjudicators may reveal their assumptions of a remedy. As I hope to illustrate, this is not to say that the different conceptual foundations do not affect-consciously or unconsciously-the interpretative function performed by arbitrators.
The Article begins with a brief discussion of the intellectual justifications and legal ideas behind investor-state arbitration. It continues with a main analysis that unpacks three different justifications for allowing the invocation of responsibility to a nonstate actor directly against a state before an arbitral forum. The Article concludes by surveying the debate around the circumstances precluding wrongfulness showing how, at the crux of it, there is a fundamental disagreement on the main goal of investor-state arbitration and explaining how this insight can be applied to other, similar debates. By engaging with such debates from this perspective-more broadly-I seek to illustrate why the procedural dimension of international investment law (remedy) cannot be completely detached from its substantive connotations (rights).
ORIGINS: A PROCEDURAL FUNCTIONALIST ENTERPRISE
The end of World War II, the dissolution of empires, and the decolonization process brought a stronger need for a legal system of protection of foreign direct investment (FDI). This need arose at a time when a dialogue between two distinct legal conceptions was heavily influencing international law. 3 On the one hand, legal positivism-whose adherents included primarily European civil law scholars-argued for the separation of law and morality and 
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NO RIGHT WITHOUT A REMEDY 833 considered the law as being posited by lawmakers. 4 On the other hand, natural law theory as presented in a more secular form adopted a different view. Natural law theorists, developed largely out of the common law tradition (which historically resisted the separation of morality and law), championed legal processes and institutional order as essential components of a market-based society. 5 Under both traditions, the law serves an important coordinative function by providing a framework against which individuals and organizations might orient actions as well as rationally evaluate interactions with others and plan ahead. 6 These two conceptions of law (legal positivism and secularized naturalism) dominated Western legal jurisprudence in the 1960's. Inspired by H. L. A. Hart and the legal philosophy of Lon L. Fuller, and profoundly located within classical liberalism's traditional emphasis of liberty and freedom, these conceptions may have influenced the creation of some important international law initiatives of that time. 7 Among other influences, legal forms experienced a process of assimilation of instrumentalism and formalism. In its final analysis it meant that international legal orders were not only the way to subject human conduct to the governance of legitimate rules, but also to limit evil regimes from implementing substantially unjust laws that curtail liberties, including economic ones. Individual rights represented a form of empowerment to liberate the individual from the state's subjugation, as well as to enable direct enforcement of such substantive ends of the law. 8 For the development of the international law applicable to investors abroad, the result of this process of assimilation was the revival of a procedural functionalist enterprise with, among others, the following features:
(1) a predominant concern for individual rights and protection of property;
(2) rules enforced by the victims backed by treaties or reciprocal agreements; (3) standard adjudicative procedures established to avoid the escalation of violence; (4) offenses treated as torts punishable by economic reparation;
(5) strong incentives for the culprit to yield to the prescribed decision due to threat of international ostracism; and (6) legal change via an evolutionary process of developing interpretations, customs and norms. 9
FUNCTION OF REMEDY: THREE DIFFERENT GOALS
Investor-state arbitration is the poster-child of international legalization, a phenomenon salient in modern international economic relations. 10 The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID" or the "Centre"), one of the five organizations of the World Bank ("WB"), can be credited with the 
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NO RIGHT WITHOUT A REMEDY 835 rapid expansion and popularity of investor-state arbitration as primary remedy to address conflicts over investments abroad. 11 The signing of the ICSID Convention and the creation of the Centre not only gave origin to an international organization specializing in international investment disputes settlement (i.e., ICSID), but it also facilitated the expansion and popularization of a system of protections for foreign investors based on a remedy for damages directly enforceable by individuals or corporations against states (i.e., private right of action). More importantly, the Convention and the Centre served to promote a particular understanding of the role of foreign direct investment ("FDI") in national economic development, to stabilize a vision of economic cooperation, and to advance-especially, after the Soviet collapse-an idea of an international "rule of law" via BITs. 12 Without being exhaustive, what follows is a brief recounting of some legalization efforts prior to the signing of the ICSID Convention. These efforts contextualize the three justificatory functions of investor-state arbitration as remedy of choice for the enforcement of international investment agreements.
Background
Prior to the 1960's, international investment dispute settlement looked different and was heavily dependent on traditionally mercantilist relationships. 13 In other words, in contrast with the current "hybrid," decentralized, and increasingly privatized system, international adjudication was built around inter- Conflicts over the treatment of property of nationals abroad have existed-at least-since the growing strength of a bourgeois merchant class in England and the Netherlands succeeded in the chartering of trade companies for overseas expansion. This victory gave rise to a mercantilist expansion in the early 17th century. 15 Conflicts then were resolved by some of the methods relied upon today (e.g., negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and adjudication) as well as some other methods that are no longer permissible under international law (e.g., armed interventions for the collection of debts or privateers authorized by a government by letters of marquee). 16 Foreign investments were put to international adjudication-at least-as early as the end of the eighteenth century, when mixed arbitral commissions under Jay's Treaty of 1794 addressed the settlement of debts to British creditors. 17 20 and consensual third-party adjudication, which many times involved contentious (and sometimes dramatic) events. Suffice it to say that the latter feature required intense diplomatic efforts or-quite frequentlywhat was termed as "'gunboat diplomacy,'" a now prohibited manifestation of self-help in international affairs. 21 Domestic systems also played (and still play) a fundamental role in disputes over foreign investment, in large part because at the core of such disputes tends to be the relationship of property. National authorities have original jurisdiction over this relationship. They may decide any conflicts originating as a consequence of the state's involvement in the recognition, regulation, affectation, extinction, etc., unless the state consents to an international form of dispute settlement. Internationalization was-in part-also a response to demands to complement some of TRANSNAT [Vol. 35:3 the perceived deficiencies of domestic courts and in some cases the inexistence of competent justice systems. 22 Especially in the eyes of capital exporter countries, national courts-particularly in the recently de-colonialized world-raised concerns as to capacity for speedy, neutral, and technical resolution of claims. 23 That was a convenient framing too since, perhaps, they were worried of rollbacks of concessions and nationalizations. Thus, in theory, prior to the expansion of investor-state arbitration, the cases involving property of aliens abroad were initially treated as domestic conflicts, unless the parties had agreed on compulsory arbitration.
Only after spending economic, diplomatic, or military resources could international adjudication follow in a mercantilist (state-to-state) mode. Only states could bring claims following the formal rules derived from general international law, commonly known as exhaustion of local remedies, espousal of claims, and diplomatic protection. 24 Dr. Aron Broches, often referred to as the founding father of ICSID, explains the fundamental change brought by the Convention in the following way:
22 Adjudication was rarely the result of pre-established dispute settlement arrangements, and very often the result of international agreements or compromises entered into by states after the alleged illicit conduct. More than once, those agreements to adjudicate disputes that affected the economic interests of nationals abroad were the product of forcefully negotiated concessions or From the legal point of view, the most striking feature of the [ICSID] Convention is that it firmly establishes the capacity of a private individual or a corporation to proceed directly against a State in an international forum, thus contributing to the growing recognition of the individual as a subject of international law. 25 In fact, the private right of action for damages enabled (and pioneered) by ICSID navigates the contours of private and public law, contractual and general rights and obligations, individual and State participation, and national and international law. It does so by borrowing elements from different legal structures, 26 including public and private international law, 27 international arbitration and ADR, 28 and international relations and diplomacy. 29 . 27 The system borrows important legal infrastructure from international law. Irrespective of whether or not an international investment agreement ("IIA"), contract, or investment law refers to international law as the law applicable to the merits of the dispute, international law will be the law governing the dispute to the extent that what is at stake is the international responsibility of a state. The tools available under public international law for the interpretation and the application of a treaty also determine formal elements of jurisdiction, competence, 28 Investor-state arbitration borrows from international arbitration and ADR the idea of technical specialization to deal with matters wherein the technical complexity surpasses the knowledge of generalist or parochial judges. It also borrows the idea of procedural fairness and territorial 'neutrality' reflected in institutions such as the party appointed arbitrator/conciliator and, in the case of U. Pa. J. Int'l L.
[ This brief background is useful to launch the three most common justifications used to defend investor-state arbitration. When dissected, the three sources support different the ICSID system, delocalized arbitration to ensure the recognition, enforcement, and execution of the arbitration even against the losing party's will. See Parra, supra note 26, at 60 (describing how Rule 6(2) was changed because arbitrators were increasingly required to disclose any past interaction or relationship with parties); W. Michael Reisman, International Investment Arbitration and ADR: Married but Best Living Apart, 24 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 185, 185-92 (2009) (arguing that ADR and international arbitration are both "adversarial" to each other and supplement each other, and often are pushed to come to settlements by the threat of compulsory arbitration). 29 Reputation and the preference for negotiated outcomes are important elements of international relations practice. Under the eyes of the planner, in an internationally interdependent world, a trustworthy reputation is necessary to attract FDI.
Reputation and cooperation are important for assessing trustworthiness of international actors and increase the likelihood that they will abide by the terms of negotiated agreements. 
Procedural Justice: Guarantee of Bargaining Power
The particular dynamics found in asymmetric conflicts over property relationships involving states and foreign investors have served as the main justification for investor-state arbitration. Under this view, the remedy represents a response to calls for access to effective justice in the form of readily available, competent, neutral, and procedurally informal (compared to the formalities imposed by public international law) processes for resolving disputes involving investments abroad. 31 Ideologically, it reflects the response to a particular way of problematizing a type of economic conflicts and the variability (and specificity) of factors involved. 32 In response to these demands, investor-state arbitration institutionalizes a form-perhaps the preferred method-of international investment disputes settlement. 33 Under this justification, the invocation of responsibility by a non-state actor against a host state is designed primarily to respond to concerns over procedural justice. Chiefly, the remedy is designed to grant direct access to seek a settlement or award that confirms that a disrupted investment by the hands of the state had value. 34 Arbitration, the dispute settlement technique and framework of dialogue, is consensual, and attempts to encourage negotiated outcomes (i. [Vol. 35:3 parties). 35 The procedural rules establish a basic methodology that ensures that a party cannot block the proceedings by refusing to cooperate in the tribunal constitution 36 and ensures a basic formal equality during the process of adjudication. 37 Under this first claim, the threat of 'neutral' international dispute settlement means that even the sturdiest state can become attractive for investors, including states who had not originally stipulated international forms of dispute settlement in individual contracts. This feature, also known as open-ended consent to arbitration, obviates the need for investors to negotiate the internationalization of a regime consisting of arbitration and an international law clause into individual contracts with the host state.
Professor Michael Reisman presents the concept of investorstate arbitration as primarily a remedy to facilitate negotiated outcomes and guarantee bargaining power in a fundamentally asymmetrical context as follows:
A common feature of foreign direct investment is that the investor has sunk substantial capital in the host [s]tate, and cannot withdraw it or simply suspend delivery and write off a small loss as might a trader in a long-term trading relationship.
The Romans said "potior est conditio defendentis," and this is likely to be the situation in foreign direct investment. So rather than having an equality of bargaining power in an exclusively negotiation-based regime, parity will cease and things will tilt heavily in favor of the respondent 36 See ICSID Convention, supra note 11, at art. 38 (allowing Chairman to appoint an arbitrator ninety days after notice at the request of one party, and after "consulting both parties as far as possible"). See also ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 35, at r. 4 (governing appointment of arbitrators by the chairman of the administrative council). 
Corrective Justice: Compartmentalization of International Economic Conflicts
The second justificatory source, corrective justice, adopts the stereotype followed by some international law experts that power is a force that works in opposition to law. Prior to the expansion of investor-state arbitration, international conflicts over the treatment of foreign property experienced the direct involvement of the states of nationality of the investor and the investment's host. In such context-according to the second foundational idea underpinning the remedy-the involvement would inescapably favor powerful states over weaker ones. With the increasing complexity of international relations, this could give rise to paralyzing diplomatic confrontations and destructive zero-sum games between states affected by the conflict. 39 Investor-State arbitration, however, attempts to create a mutually beneficial setting for several of the parties involved. It does so by compartmentalizing potentially daunting conflicts between states into individual disputes between investors and states.
This-some may argue-helps to "de-politicize" internationally distressing conflicts, liberating a tense space between states to be employed for building constructive relationships. 40 This approach assumes that law tames the role of power in world politics, favoring long-term cooperation, stability and diplomatic solidarity.
As the goal-based argument goes, to compartmentalize conflicts and relax state-to-state relations, a less formal order (as compared to the system of adjudication of public international law) and, to some extent, more transparent process (as compared to the informal efforts that the WB would provide at request of member states) was "institutionalized. or a corporation to proceed directly against a state in an international forum, the remedy should help to reduce the interference of the state of nationality of the investor in the domestic affairs of the host state. This should also be reassuring for the host state because it allows it to avoid the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the courts of another, often more powerful, state. 42 With a remedy to directly enforce breaches of international investment law, the foreign investor improves her position by having a better ability to assess the risks in investing abroad, and, if the reasonable operating assumptions are affected by excessive government intervention, the foreign investor may be able to succeed and obtain reparation in an independent legal process. 43 By obviating the need for diplomatic protection, the investor has much more control, including the ability to influence the outcome by bringing arguments that better fit her reality and appointing neutral arbitrators. The investor is also insulated from the arbitrariness of the practice of diplomatic protection. In this sense, under this second functional source, investor-state arbitration follows a corrective justice rationale because it is more interested in the "victim's" perspective, i.e., the entity that allegedly suffered injustice at the hands of the infracting state. 44 For the host state and the state of nationality of the investor the benefits are also clear: not only can the respondent avoid-in theory-facing the state of nationality of the investor (often more powerful given investment trends) in the dispute, but both could focus on building constructive relationships and avoiding foul claims over money. 45 
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NO RIGHT WITHOUT A REMEDY 845 settlement will reduce the possibility of abuses by powerful states by prohibiting the espousal of the claim unless, of course, the respondent state fails to abide by and comply with the pecuniary obligations of the awards. 46 This goal of de-politicization also requires building a specific legal and institutional infrastructure. This infrastructure represented a historical quid pro quo: the private right of action and the commitment of states to recognize and enforce pecuniary obligations as if they were the final judgment of a national court were paralleled by the obligation on the part of the state of nationality of the investor to exercise restraint and not to intervene in the dispute. 47 In short, this second defense of investor-state arbitration originates from the attempts to compartmentalize international economic conflicts and the consequent insulation of inter-state politics through a formal international legal process. 48 Under this view, the remedy is chiefly a system of protection for foreign art. 27 ("No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection, or bring an international claim, in respect of a dispute which one if its nationals and another Contracting State shall have consented to submit or shall have submitted to arbitration under this Convention, unless such other Contracting State shall have failed to abide by and comply with the award rendered in such dispute."). 46 See SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 416 ("[T]he arbitration procedure provided by ICSID offers considerable advantages to both sides. The foreign investor no longer depends on the uncertainties of diplomatic protection but obtains direct access to an international remedy. The dispute settlement process is depoliticized and subjected to objective legal criteria . . . . In turn, by consenting to ICSID arbitration the host State obtains the assurance that it will not be exposed to an international claim by the investor's home State, as long as it abides by the award.") 47 
Deterrence: Prevention of Opportunistic Behavior of States
The post-War stabilization efforts resulted in the continued desire on the part of western policy-makers to involve private enterprise in economic activity and to encourage private investment to eventually replace aid programs and state subsidization. At the same time, these efforts contributed to understanding risk management and the creation of agencies to address non-commercial risks like inconvertibility, expropriation, civil war, revolution, or insurrection. 50 These ideas of risk reduction, free market, and economic efficiency underscore the third functional goal of investor-state arbitration: prevention of opportunistic behavior of states. Informed by 'neoclassical' economic theory, some economists and development specialists advocated-successfully-for the extension of a private right of action for damages as a risk reducing commitment. Under this theory, private FDI leads to economic growth and economic development. In order to encourage FDI, well-defined property rights adopted in different instruments of protection (i.e., relationship-specific contracts, foreign investment laws, or investment treaties) shall be complemented by access to a functional dispute-settlement forum. Without a proper forum, 49 property rights' enforcement would be unreliable, and unreliability creates higher risks as well as lower incentives to invest. 51 Under this third justificatory source, investor-state arbitration is first a mechanism for enforcement of international commitments that would deter opportunistic and rapacious behavior or capture on the part of governments against foreign investors. The remedy is therefore considered to be the enforcement side that minimizes some risks for long-term commitment of resources. The quid pro quo in this strategy requires states to surrender original jurisdiction for potential claims to international investment dispute settlement in the hope of attracting sustained fluxes of FDI that will increase the possibilities for economic development.
For that, the theoretical focus of the remedy is deterrence; the process of economic compensation to affected investors serves mainly as an ex post remedy in order to assure that ex ante potential wrongdoers will weigh the costs of injury against the benefits of productive activity.
Under this third claim, investor-state arbitration enables the use of private rights of action for damages as a risk-reducing commitment.
The argument follows that this deters the opportunistic behavior of states, having in mind-in the long run-incentivizing foreign investment. This theory is expressed in the analysis of law and economic scholars like Professor Alan O. Sykes:
[T]he utility of a private right of action for money damages is obvious. To see why, consider a world of BITs without the private action. In the event of an uncompensated expropriation or similar action, an investor would have to lobby [her] own government to take some sort of action against the violator state. The investor might be politically inefficacious in this process for any number of reasons.
[She] might be unable to offer enough political benefits in return for the governments' assistance.
[Her] government might have diplomatic reasons for declining to take any action or for declining to retaliate against the violator in any effective way.
And even if some retaliation were forthcoming, the retaliation might do nothing to 51 See BROCHES NOTE, supra note 30, at 244 (quoting one of the delegates participating in the ICSID Convention negotiation, "economic development could not be achieved without capital and . . . developing countries would not obtain capital unless they provided adequate [legal] In summary, functionally investor-state arbitration can be conceptualized in three different ways: first, as a method for investment dispute settlement; second, as a system to achieve legalization towards an increased 'de-politicization' of investment disputes; and, third, as a mechanism for the removal of impediments to the free international flow of private investment that are posed by non-commercial risks. This distinction also reaffirms the three dimensions of investor-state arbitration and stresses particular theories of compensation: first, as the preferred specialized international method for investment dispute settlement concerned with procedural justice; second, as a (self-contained and delocalized in the case of ICSID) process to deciding legal disputes between states and investors allowing for direct corrective justice; and third, as a multilateral enforcement mechanism concerned with deterrence of conducts affecting investments abroad. Of course, these three distinctions are somehow oversimplified, but I believe they capture the basic intuitions that may animate the arbitrators' reasoning. The following section discusses how each of these different conceptions may animate a different functional relationship with treaty rights under international law.
NATURE OF RIGHT: FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP
In this section, I use the debate around the operation of a countermeasure in response to an anterior breach by a home state in the investor-state context to show how the three approaches may imply different functional relationships with the rights conferred under BITs.
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Background
The debate arose in the context of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) investment provisions. 53 After a longstanding disagreement regarding the specific meaning of the treaty provisions, the Mexican Congress approved a controversial excise tax on the use of fructose on soft drinks. Instead of collecting revenue, the tax indirectly forced soft drink producers to use Mexican sugar by excessively taxing the sale of soft drinks made with fructose while exempting those made with cane sugar. The measure openly discriminated against fructose producers in Mexico (almost exclusively owned by U.S. investors).
Four U.S. companies started three investor-state arbitration proceedings on behalf of their controlled and locally-incorporated subsidiaries. Since Mexico's efforts to consolidate these claims failed, the cases were conducted in separate proceedings. The claimants argued that the tax was, among other things, inconsistent with Mexico's national treatment obligation under the investment protection provisions of NAFTA.
During the investor-State proceedings adjudicating these claims, Mexico conceded the discriminatory character of the tax but argued that it was a "legitimate countermeasure" that precluded wrongfulness adopted in response to what Mexico characterized as a prior U.S. violation of intra-state obligations under NAFTA. The three tribunals decided that the tax was discriminatory, in violation of the national treatment obligation, and that Mexico's actions entailed liability. However, the tribunals faced the question of whether a countermeasure for the alleged prior violations by the United States could be directly applicable to investors. While reaching the same practical outcomes, the three tribunals decided the case differently, sparking a doctrinal debate regarding the nature of investors' rights. 54 Such controversy has been elegantly dissected by Martins Paparinskis as follows: [Vol. 35:3
[e]ven though the host state may in principle apply countermeasures to investment obligations, their effect and limits depend on the nature of the investors' rights.
Countermeasures are relative in effect and may not be adopted otherwise than in response to a prior breach of international law by the entity to which the obligation is owed. 55 In his brilliant contribution addressing this topic, he explains that adopting the analytical perspective of investors' rights either as right-holders (by reference to human and consular rights analogies), beneficiaries (by reference to the law of treaties rules on third states analogies), or agents (by reference to diplomatic protection analogies), has the following implications:
From the perspective of delegated diplomatic protection, the host state owes primary obligations only to the home state, and the investor only invokes responsibility for their breach; consequently, countermeasures can be successfully opposed to the only beneficiary of the obligation and can in principle successfully preclude wrongfulness, provided that other criteria are satisfied. However, if the investor is also the beneficiary of the obligation (whether akin to a third party or as an entity with direct rights), then the precluding wrongfulness of countermeasures, while opposable to one beneficiary (the home state), is not opposable to the other beneficiary (the investor). 56
Third-Party Rights: Access to Justice and Dispute Settlement
As presented under the procedural justice approach, investorstate arbitration serves fundamentally as a remedy to ensure access to justice, neutrality, and fairness by empowering individuals and corporations to directly participate in a dispute settlement process-arguably an option that may be unavailable to foreigners before domestic justice systems or elsewhere. Without fully 55 Paparinskis, supra note 2, at 632 (emphasis added). 
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NO RIGHT WITHOUT A REMEDY 851 entering into the merits of such debate, it is fair to say that the defense of investor-state arbitration under this basis can be taken with a grain of salt. For instance, it is often argued that investorstate arbitration is not fair because decision-makers are not truly independent. 57 According to some authors, "the development of this new 'common law of investment' has been placed primarily in the hands of an exceedingly small pool of super-elite, like-minded international lawyers who operate largely divorced from any municipal political process." 58 Moreover, in part because of design elements (e.g., cost, capacity, access to expertise, etc.), investor-state arbitration is not truly accessible to the majority of the business community. 59 Therefore, the investor-state may only serve the interests of large transnational corporations since in actuality the remedy is accessible to very few actors, and arguably only supports already empowered global economic participants. In any event, the direct invocation of responsibility by a nonstate actor against a host state in an arbitral setting under this perspective serves a fundamental task: to provide foreigners investing abroad with a neutral, non-state forum for reparation that may increase access to justice and by implication equalize bargaining power between the sovereign and the regulated party.
The majority decision of the tribunal in Corn Products v. Mexico (Greenwood and Serrano de la Vega) may be paradigmatic of the impulse to think of investor-state arbitration as a remedy [Vol. 35:3 fundamentally concerned with access to justice and dispute settlement. Functionally, the remedy formalizes a procedure that ensures a certain level of neutrality for addressing conflicts. It gives the affected investors direct control over the claims, and ensures that proceedings can continue even without direct participation of the host state. The following excerpt of Corn Products compares the investors' own benefit of international obligations to the rights of a third party, and hence the remedy is a procedural endeavor primarily concerned with access to international justice:
It has long been the case that international lawyers have treated as a fiction the notion that in diplomatic protection cases the State was asserting a right of its own-violated because an injury done to its national was in fact an injury to the State itself. It was a necessary fiction, because procedurally only a State could bring an international claim, but the fact that it did not reflect substantive reality showed through not only in the juristic writing but also in various rules of law surrounding diplomatic protection claims . . . . However, there is no need to continue that fiction in a case in which the individual is vested with the right to bring claims of its own. In such a case there is no question of the investor claiming on behalf of the State. 
Direct Rights: De-Politicization and Compensation
The specialization and de-politicization functions of the remedy are both concerned with its effects on conflict resolution. However, the de-politicization function is specifically concerned with the diplomatic relationship between the investor's state of nationality of the investor and the host state of the investor. Under this functional claim of the remedy, formalizing disputes without the involvement of the investor's state of nationality results in equality among states, limiting arbitrariness and "abuses of diplomatic protection." 61 The assumption is that without investorstate arbitration, foreign investment disputes will be relegated to the sphere of power politics, and dominant global powers would reign. 62 Hence the arbitration format (investors-state) and relief (damages only) help to frame political and economic conflicts in stable ways for the pursuit of larger policy goals. 63 Of course, the arbitration process cannot always guarantee fairness. International realists, as well as critical legal scholars, have long pointed to the ways in which international law itself is instrumental to and shaped by power. 64 [Vol. 35:3 the stereotype that power is a force that works in opposition to law. 65 At the same time, the remedy may serve as substitutes that allow domestic power brokers to "exit local jurisdictions with poor institutions," or to affect judicial politics around specific normative issues by extending corrective options to foreign investors. 66 The correct interpretative exercise to determine whether direct invocation of the investor should be viewed as a third party or as an entity with direct rights requires a complex analysis reaching into the broader architecture of investment law. 67 I leave that discussion to more able scholars. My point is simply that under a direct rights approach of the remedy, the emphasis is in the corrective nature of the remedy. This function opens the possibility of material compensation without distressing other relationships between states (or states and its nationals) by reducing the spaces for arbitrariness and abuses that come with the exercise of diplomatic protection.
In this sense, one can read the direct right to invoke responsibility as a mechanism to correct a breach to international commitments through payment of compensatory damages. It allows the 'victim' or investor who allegedly suffered the wrong at the hands of the authorities, to obtain a finding that a breach has occurred and, if it is the case, possibly receive a direct payment of damages for the violation by the host state without any involvement of the home state. This picture of investor-state arbitration, as primarily a corrective mechanism for foreign pronouncements of powerful states and are subject to change along with fluctuations in state power investors, is adopted by Professor Lowenfeld in a separate opinion in the case referred to above: Corn Products v. Mexico. He takes issue with the majority opinion's characterization of investors' rights as being similar to third-party rights, and stresses the depoliticization role of the remedy in the following passage:
[T]he essential feature of investor-[s]tate arbitration, as it has developed since the ICSID Convention . . . is that controversies between foreign investors and host states are insulated from political and diplomatic relations between states. In return for agreeing to independent international arbitration, the host state is assured that the state of the investor's nationality (as defined) will not espouse the investor's claim or otherwise intervene in the controversy between an investor and a host state, for instance by denying foreign assistance or attempting to pressure the host state into some kind of settlement. Correspondingly, the state of the investor's nationality is relieved of the pressure of having its relations with the host state disturbed or distorted by a controversy between its national and the host state. . . . The paradigm in investor-States disputes, . . . is a dispute between the first party (nearly always the investor) as plaintiff, and the second party (nearly always the host state or state agency) as respondent. There is no third party. 68 Moreover, a different tribunal in Cargill v. Mexico (Pryles, Caron, and McRae) analyzing the exact same issue also stressed the corrective function of the remedy. After examining the arguments posed by the respondent, it concluded:
[I]t is the investor that is named in the operating paragraph or 'dispositive' of the award. . . . [the granting of rights under the investment treaty] is no different from rights of individuals within many municipal legal systems. That the origin of individual rights may be found in the act of a sovereign, or in the joint act of sovereigns, does not negate the existence of the rights conferred. . investor that institutes the claim, that calls a tribunals into existence, and that is the named party in all respects to the resulting proceedings and award. 69 
Delegated Rights: Risk Assessment and Conflict Prevention
The final archetypal function of investor-state arbitration as a remedy of international investment law is to serve as a source of certainty and to incentivize flows of FDI. 70 This is anchored in the belief that "the prospect of involvement in . . . [investor-state arbitration] proceedings will work as a deterrent to the actions which give rise to the institution of proceedings". 71 The embedded idea in this conceptualization-investors as rational decision makers-has been most recently challenged by the findings of behavioral economists and social psychologists, which show that human decisions are not purely rational. 72 Instead, they are susceptible to systematic biases and errors, and they are greatly affected by internal processes that do not correspond to a cost-benefit analysis. 73 Similarly, scholars have long argued that law-related considerations often play a surprisingly minor role in the organization and implementation of business affairs and in decisions to invest. 74 Again, I leave this debate for another time and here only refer to other important works in the area. 75 The interpretation of the function of the remedy as primarily an element of deterrence emphasizes its utility for business planning and ex ante conflict prevention. It stresses that by agreeing to grant a remedy states may be less likely to commit acts, which would give rise to conflict. If so, there is a credibly "enforceable" commitment. The remedy is precisely that enforcement side that acts as an (distant) element of inhibition. The potential relief is monetary damages that serve to alleviate (some) concerns over the effective application of a 'rule of law,' especially in countries with difficult institutional environments (courts or otherwise).
Under this conceptualization of the remedy, the right to invoke responsibility against the state is akin to a delegated right. This right is assigned from the original right holders (the sovereigns) to an entire universe of economic participants, as defined by the international investment instrument.
The international agreements, while celebrated between states, establish a mechanism through which the parties can give up the international right to espouse the claims of a national before an international forum. The delegation serves to protect-first and foremost-the investor by reducing the additional cost of higher risks (as reflected in the risk premium on new investments). It creates more certainty in the investor's decision process by limiting potential arbitrariness in the exercise of diplomatic protection, in the application of reprisals against a state found in violation and in the allocation of the (eventual) retaliation benefits to compensate the investor for its losses. Under the view of the "delegated diplomatic protection" the host state owes primary obligations only to the home state, and the investor only invokes responsibility for their breach. The right to invoke responsibility is the only carve-out from a "robust" and optimal regime of general international law. 76 hat difference does it make whether an investor's right to redress for a wrong committed is . . . direct or derivative?" 79 As it turns out, this question "is crucial in certain cases" such as consent to the commission of a wrongful act, waivers of obligations, or the application of countermeasures-the latter a fundamental issue in such dispute. 80 However, Rovine also makes an emblematic point: "[a] right to a remedy is a substantive right. Legal redress for the wrong committed is a substantive right." 81 This is perhaps the main point behind this article. While the problematic character of the "public-private" distinction has long been recognized by international legal theorists, the field pays little attention to the methodological limitations of the "proceduralsubstantive" analysis.
As Paparinskis argues, the different conceptualization of the right to directly invoke responsibility against a state does not relieve the tribunal of "a diligent application of traditional techniques of legal reasoning." 82 These traditional techniques and the rules of state responsibility say very little about this substantive/procedural dichotomy. The nature of investors' rights is left to the particular primary rules. 83 Attributing particular content to this primary rule, i.e., the right to directly invoke responsibility, is precisely what arbitrators do when interpreting the "procedural" dimension of international investment law. In this sense, it is understandable why different arbitrators may ascribe different meaning to it based on the different functional reasons used historically to promote investorstate arbitration. Indeed, a careful analysis of the transformation of ICSID demonstrates how the argument justifying investor-state arbitration has changed and adopted different narratives, emphasizing at times its role to grant access to justice and de-U. Pa. J. Int'l L.
[Vol. 35:3 politicization or, more recently, its potential role in national economic development. The three-level theory presented here could be applicable and helpful to understanding other areas where tribunals show disagreement on fundamental aspects of the procedural dimension of international investment law, such as the type of noncompensatory relief (e.g., injunctions, cessation, punitive damages) obtainable in investor-state arbitration. 84 Of course, such questions may, in principle be determined by the investment instrument. Assuming a lack of interpretative guidance, one could understand why arbitrators contemplating deterrence as an important role of investor-state arbitration would be more willing to accept punitive damages (to raise the 'cost' of opportunistic behavior on the hands of states), or arbitrators concerned with procedural justice would more readily grant injunctions (to avoid the difficulties faced by foreigners before domestic courts), or why arbitrators concerned with corrective justice would accept to order cessations (to limit the effects of a wrong at the hands of authorities). This is just another example of the ways in which the different functions of the remedy i.e., procedural justice, corrective justice, or deterrence speak to investment rights.
CONCLUSION
Justice Holmes once observed that "[l]egal obligations that exist but cannot be enforced are ghosts that are seen in the law but that are elusive to the grasp." 85 Without investor-state arbitration, investment law obligations would be more elusive and hence the unique role of this remedy in the future of foreign investment protection.
Understanding the foundations of the main enforcement mechanism of international investment law is not 84 Of course, these representations are to some degree caricatures, but they capture basic intuitions that may animate the arbitrators' reasoning. These differences may also evidence some of the limitations of the substance-procedure dichotomy. As illustrated by this work, the construction of substantive law entails assumptions about the procedures that will apply when that substantive law is ultimately enforced. 
